Resource allocation in oil-dependent communities:Oil rent and benefit sharing arrangements by Tulaeva, Svetlana & Nysten-Haarala, Soili
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Lapland
This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version usually
differs somewhat from the publisher’s final version, if the self-archived
version is the accepted author manuscript.
Resource allocation in oil-dependent communities
Tulaeva, Svetlana; Nysten-Haarala, Soili
Published in:
Resources
DOI:
10.3390/resources8020086
Published: 01.06.2019
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for pulished version (APA):
Tulaeva, S., & Nysten-Haarala, S. (2019). Resource allocation in oil-dependent communities: Oil rent and benefit
sharing arrangements. Resources, 8(2), [86]. https://doi.org/10.3390/resources8020086
Document License
CC BY
Download date: 11. May. 2020
resources
Article
Resource Allocation in Oil-Dependent Communities:
Oil Rent and Benefit Sharing Arrangements
Svetlana Tulaeva 1,* and Soili Nysten-Haarala 2
1 Faculty of International Relations and Politics, North-West Institute of Management, Russian Presidential
Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, 194044 St. Petersburg, Russia
2 Faculty of Law, University of Lapland, 96300 Rovaniemi, Finland; soili.nysten-haarala@ulapland.fi
* Correspondence: svett07@mail.ru
Received: 2 March 2019; Accepted: 18 April 2019; Published: 3 May 2019


Abstract: This study is dedicated to the interaction between oil and gas companies and local
communities that depend deeply on the production of oil. One of the key concerns of all oil-dependent
communities is the distribution of oil rent: Who participates in decision making regarding the
distribution of oil profits and who can claim the benefits and on what grounds? Benefit sharing
arrangements are used to decide such matters in global practice. Using Russian Arctic and subarctic
areas as examples, we analyze the main rules and practices of the distribution of benefits from oil
production at the local level. This study focuses on the coexistence of oil companies and indigenous
people, many of whom practice a traditional way of life. We also pay attention to the institutionalization
of the norms and rules of oil-dependent communities at the local level.
Keywords: indigenous people; oil-dependent communities; oil companies; Russian Arctic
1. Introduction
The introduction of new technologies in the 19th century suddenly boosted the value of oil, making
it one of the symbols of economic progress and political power in the world. From a sticky substance
used to light kerosene lamps, it became the key resource for industrial progress [1]. Technological
progress and the creation of relevant infrastructure also made oil a supreme resource. By the end
of the 20th century, the world had completely turned into a society symbolically referred to as the
oil Leviathan [2]. This society has certain distinguishing features. First, there is a close dependence
between economic prosperity and the production and export of oil. There is even a group of countries
whose progress has depended on the price of oil for many decades [3]. Second, oil can be used as
a political tool in the oil-dependent society. The third prominent feature of the oil-dependent society is
the development of an oil ideology. A number of countries have started to embrace the idea of national
supremacy, based on their control over energy resources. This is why researchers speak of resource
nationalism and the use of natural resources as a tool to strengthen the idea of national exclusivity.
Resource nationalism, in turn, leads to the development of a power ideology. On the one hand, this
provides an oil producing nation with a chance to substantiate its political ambitions in the global
arena and to legitimize its existing power or influence and, on the other hand, it justifies a lack of
economic growth and material prosperity among the deprived population [3].
Just as any other society, oil-dependent societies have their own sets of rules and norms of behavior,
their own beliefs and rituals, their own distribution of power and authority, and their own types
of conflicts and the methods for their resolution. According to Douglas Rogers, the depth of the oil
well is always directly proportional to the depth of institutional transformations [4]. Most existing
research papers on the topic analyze the influence of the oil curse on political institutions at the national
level [3,4]. In this study, we focus on the influence of the oil curse on the social institutions of the
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oil-dependent society. We also study agreements on the distribution of benefits between oil companies
and indigenous people. Indigenous peoples leading a traditional life are the most vulnerable group in
terms of industrial development in their territories, and they are occasionally forced to fight for their
rights in conflicts with oil companies. One of the key questions regarding such interaction relates to
the rules of the distribution of oil rent among various groups of stakeholders.
We mainly pay attention to the rules of the distribution of resources among oil and gas
companies, state authorities, and local residents in the oil-dependent communities of Russian regions.
The development of the oil-dependent society in the indigenous regions of the Russian North dates
back to the Soviet Union. Oil drilling started in the northern territories following the Second World War.
Geological surveys were conducted in this area in the 1950s and 1960s, and a little later the identified
sources of oil were subjected to drilling. Traditional communities were aected by the construction
of industrial facilities, the shrinking native territories, the arrival of many nonlocals bringing along
new lifestyles, the development of infrastructure, and the spread of technology [5,6]. Following the
perestroika era, a crisis and a shift to a market economy, the oil and gas companies that maintained the
infrastructure in these areas became the key economic players. The shift from a planned to a market
economy required the development of new rules of engagement between oil companies and local
communities. The process of enacting the new rules was accompanied by a rise in the number of
conflicts [7–10].
We can identify some of the reasons behind these conflicts. First, the increase in oil production led
to a decrease in agricultural land area used by the locals. This problem is very acute for indigenous
people, who practice a traditional lifestyle. The shrinkage of land threatened the conservation
of reindeer herding and other traditional lifestyles [5,8]. Land-related conflicts were persistent in
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YNAO) in the 1990s and in Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO) in
the beginning of the 2000s. In Yamal, such conflicts grew into open protests, whereas in NAO they
were latent by nature. Second, oil production aected the environment. Industrial activity deteriorated
pastures and decimated fish populations in the rivers. Despite the related legal environmental norms,
oil production brings along spills and other industrial accidents [9–12]. In fact, the deteriorating
environment became one of the reasons why indigenous people protested against oil companies in
Yamal in the mid-1990s and in the Republic of Komi in 2010–2016. Third, industrial activity desecrated
indigenous people’s holy places. Since many indigenous communities adhere to pagan beliefs, it was
important for them to preserve their holy lakes and sockets, i.e., the places in which they could perform
pagan rituals. Oil drilling close to the holy sites of indigenous people indeed became one of the causes
of conflict between oil companies and indigenous people in Sakhalin in the mid-2000s. Exxon Oil and
Gas Limited started using indigenous people’s holy field to store their industrial stock, which aroused
dislike among the local population and became the starting point of a wave of protests against oil and
gas companies in Sakhalin [13–17]. A similar incident took place in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug
(KMAO), where a conflict broke out in 2015–2017 because of oil drilling performed by “Surgutneftegaz”
in the Numto and Ilmor lake area. Despite the fact that it was a holy territory, the oil company was
not willing to give up on these lands, because they held vast reserves of oil [9,18,19]. Last, conflicts
were caused by the amount of money paid by the oil companies to local people to compensate for
damage. This issue was very acute in the 1990s, when there were no formalized rules for assessing
compensation [18,19]. In this paper, we analyze the dierent ways to resolve such conflicts between
companies and local communities in oil-dependent Russian regions. The article focuses on the rules
of the distribution of oil rent in oil-dependent communities and the ways in which these rules aect
social institutions.
The main questions of this research are the following: (1) How are the rules of oil rent distribution
institutionalized at the local level in oil-dependent communities and (2) how does the order of the
distribution of oil rent aect societal relations?
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2. Theoretical Framework: Oil, Institutions and Society
The theoretical framework of this study is neo-institutionalism. According to this approach,
institutions are understood as formal and informal rules of interaction between actors [20]. Institutions
are created by people to reduce transactional costs and the related uncertainties. Institutions mean
cognitive, normative and regulatory frameworks that make it possible to integrate collaborators’
actions, to determine the hierarchy of positions and to identify the dierent stakeholders operating
in the same space. They form and sanction a relatively uniform code of conduct for inter-personal
relations and help in the mutual creation of a shared system of values [20].
The process of institutional formation is complicated and is influenced by many factors. Of these
factors, we focus on the availability of significant natural resources such as oil. Many studies have
been conducted on the interdependence between the resource curse and institutions [21–24]. Can
the physical nature of a key natural resource determine the political and social fabric of society?
The majority of researchers agree that there is a close bond between the abundance of resources, the
level of state control, and the development of institutions in less-developed, resource-rich societies.
Ch. Tilly and M. Olson have noted that the formation of states was due to the institutionalization
of certain forms of management and protection in exchange for the provision of some resources
to military commanders [21,22]. In given territories, rulers enabled the formation of political and
economic institutions that stabilized local people’s lives in exchange to acquiring the right to collect
taxes. According to A. Etkind and M. Ross, the nature of the resources available to the state and the
rulers determines the formation of appropriate political institutions. In other words, in exchange for
resources, the state provides the people with various institutions. Diering resources have diering
features that are connected not only with their physical characteristics but also with their institutional
characteristics [23–25]. This means that while being one of the key resources in modern times, oil also
has specific features that aect the development of political, economic and cultural institutions in
oil-dependent communities.
Researchers focus on some of the institutionally significant features of oil that play an important
role in less developed, undemocratic societies. One of the key features of oil is its capability to bring
considerable profits for the state. M. Ross notes that in forming state institutions, the main source of
state revenue plays an important role. To rephrase, a person is what he eats and state is what funds
it collects [8]. If the state’s main source of revenue is taxation, the state is more considerate toward
society and dependent on it. However, if the state can collect revenues from other sources, such as
the export of oil, it is less likely to be aected by the pressure exerted by the citizens. The economic
non-interest of the oil Leviathan in its citizens is accentuated by the fact that the oil industry does not
need much workforce. The production of oil requires a limited number of highly qualified workers.
According to A. Etkind, this determines a government’s attitude towards the people of the country:
citizens turn from a resource and a source of prosperity into objects of philanthropy. The rulers do not
consider the people as a valuable resource that needs to be developed as a good investment. Therefore,
some of the oil and gas producing countries are super-extractive states, where the prosperity of the
political and economic elite does not depend on the people, but is determined by other factors such as
global oil prices [23]. In such societies, the main reason why the state subsidizes its citizens is to gain
their political loyalty [24–26]. The state buys its citizens’ loyalty by increasing social transfers of the
oil revenue towards the people [25]. However, the spending of hyper-profits generated by oil sales
leads to an increase in secretiveness and translucency. In many oil-producing countries, citizens do
not have the capacity to control the amount of money that their government earns through oil sales.
In fact, it is practically impossible to find authentic data about the countries’ oil revenue. Combined
with weak democratic structures, this reduces the social accountability of the government [23].
High-profit resources ferment conflicts over the right of ownership. According to research, these
conflicts are more frequent in oil-dependent societies than elsewhere [23,27,28]. The distribution
of oil rent in these societies is not equal, and the benefits and costs of oil production are always
distributed hierarchically.
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Conflicts can be latent or they may turn into armed struggles. Not all researchers agree that
there is a clear connection between conflicts and oil. For example, M. Ross notes that oil can have
two contradicting eects: it may restrain insurgencies, as it increases people’s income, or it may cause
revolts in a country’s oil-rich regions. If oil restrains conflicts, it aects the whole country, but if it
instigates them, only the oil-rich regions are aected [23]. G. Schlee is also doubtful about the influence
of natural resources on the level of conflict in society. According to him, there is no such thing as
a conflict over resources or a resource-instigated conflict. He maintains that any conflict that looks like
a conflict over resources is in fact a conflict caused by ethnic, religious and/or linguistic dierences.
Oil is often merely a catalyst of conflict [28]. M. Ross supports this view by noting that oil-related
conflicts are amplified in areas where oil is complemented by ethnic or religious dissatisfaction [23].
All over the world, the oil and gas industry mainly develops in vertically integrated holdings [4].
Such form of industrial organization enables the reduction of transaction costs and increases the stability
of the companies. To guarantee the security of its investment, a business must integrate the source of oil
and the refinery into a single industrial structure. Meanwhile, a vertically integrated business structure
is based on a strictly hierarchical system of management, which is also applied to the business’s social
activities. An oil company’s social and cultural projects are also executed within the framework of
this vertically integrated structure of management [4]. These projects are supposed to legitimize
the dominating stakeholders, as well as to create an aura of social prosperity and equal distribution
of oil benefits. K. Humphrey equates oil companies with medieval overlords, who took control
of large underdeveloped territories with minimum infrastructure and local populations, awaiting
comprehensive support and large cash flows [29]. In such cases, social and cultural policies are also
subjected to vertical integration and hence become dependent on the major players. The social and
cultural projects executed by oil companies and the state in oil producing areas are selected from the
perspective of the dominating players, and they do not necessarily conform to the needs of the majority
of the people [4].
Hence, many researchers say that oil and gas as key natural resources determine the formation of
relevant political institutions and stimulate the advancement of autocratic political systems. It has also
been noted that an abundance of oil deteriorates eective institutions or leads to their replacement
with less-eective ones [25]. Other researchers tend to support the idea that the oil curse is not a crucial
factor of poverty. The slow economic growth in some oil-rich states is not due to the negative influence
of excessive oil profits, but to the ineective institutions that the states have inherited [23]. The oil
curse will have negative consequences in a society with weak democratic institutions. In this case,
the availability of oil revenues increases the possibility that the authorities ignore the participation of
citizens in decision-making processes and use the practices of social patronage towards the citizens.
The governments of oil-rich countries are not always ready to resolve problems associated with the
distribution of oil rent, the lacking interest of the state and oil companies in the population, and the
fluctuation of oil revenues. The authorities tend to mask or negate the existing problems through
relevant cultural and social programs. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to institutions
that regulate the distribution of oil revenues within oil-dependent communities. Examples of such
institutions are benefit-sharing agreements between oil companies and local residents. In this paper,
we address the institutionalization of these agreements in Russia.
3. Research Materials, Methods and Research Questions
This study focuses on the sharing of benefits in the regions of northern Russia where oil
companies operate: Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO), Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (KMAO),
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YNAO), and Sakhalin Island. NAO and YANAO are located
above the Arctic circle, while Khanty—Mansi Autonomus Okrug is situated in western Siberia and
borders the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous district. Sakhalin Island is located in northeastern Russia
(See Figure 1). Oil and gas corporations are operating in all of these regions, where there is very little
other industry that would not depend on the oil industry. On the one hand, oil companies build
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and maintain most of the local social infrastructure, and on the other hand, they determine the social
and political trends in these territories, thereby converting them into oil-dependent communities.
Since tax revenues flow almost totally to the federation, the regional authorities are dependent on good
relations with the companies. Based on soviet legacy, companies are expected to take care of the local
infrastructure as negotiated with the regional authorities. Although this bond between the companies
and the regional authorities resembles taxation, it leaves the companies a lot of power to decide the
way in which they support the regions [5].
Figure 1. Administrative map of Russia. Source: Maps of Russian Federation. URL: http://www.maps-
of-europe.net/maps/maps-of-russia/administrative-map-of-russia.jpg.
A distinctive feature of these regions is that they contain large groups of indigenous people, some of
which follow traditional lifestyles. These indigenous groups are the Nenets (NAO, KHMAO, YANAO),
the Khanty and the Mansi (KHMAO), and the Nivkhi and the Ulta (Sakhalin). Their livelihoods
represent subsistence economy: fishing, hunting and reindeer herding. Although there are some
markets for their products, their livelihoods cannot compete with the oil industry in economic
productivity. People representing this lifestyle do not share the same ideal of economic prosperity
with oil companies, regional authorities or other local populations. According to tradition, they are
satisfied with living o the land, which they aim to pass to the next generations. The local residents
view the arrival of oil companies in an ambivalent manner. On the one hand, oil extraction is regarded
as a matter of national importance and an opportunity to receive significant economic support from the
companies, which in fact finance the construction of schools, gymnasiums and residential buildings.
The material aid that the local residents receive from the companies provides them greater comfort.
On the other hand, the arrival of the oil companies is perceived as a threat to the traditional way of
life in the tundra, which indigenous people consider their home. For this reason, indigenous people
are concerned about the forced limitations on reindeer herding and environmental pollution caused
by industrial development. These people have always been closely tied to land; that land is not only
important for reindeer herding and fishing, but also the basis for their spiritual culture. The reduction
of land area inhabited by indigenous people alters their social norms and deteriorates their ethnic
identity. According to our research, all these processes stimulated social transformations in the studied
local communities.
This study is based on grounded theory and qualitative methods [30,31]. The use of grounded
theory included the following stages: collection of empirical data, their careful coding, selection and
interpretation of analytical concepts, comparison of the analytical categories with new data, further
elaboration of the analytical concepts, formation of theoretical conclusions, and validation of the
results. At the same time, data collection and analysis were carried out in parallel. The main methods
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of data collection were semi-structured interviews, document analysis and participative observation.
We interviewed representatives of the regional and local authorities, representatives of oil and gas
companies, local residents of oil production areas, and experts from scientific and research institutes and
social organizations. The interviews were conducted with representatives of the following companies:
Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, Sakhalin Energy and Exxon Neftegas Limited. In addition, interviews were
conducted with representatives of the state authorities and local residents in Salekhard, Seikha (YNAO),
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Nekrasovka, Okha, Nogliki (Sakhalin), Khanty-Mansiysk, Numto (KHMAO),
Naryan-Mar, Nelmin-Nos Horei Ver, and Krasnoe (NAO). A special guide was appointed for each
group of informants. The crucial issues were focused on the main forms of interaction between
companies, local residents and authorities, as well as on the economic and social consequences of
the existing forms of interaction for local communities. The respondents were asked the following
questions: What forms of corporate and state assistance to local communities are the most widespread?
What forms of assistance are the most eective from your point of view and why? What are the
negative impacts of industrial activities on local communities? What are the causes of conflicts between
companies and local residents? The informants were selected with the help of the snowball method.
Altogether, 95 interviews were conducted, and they were all subsequently transcribed and analyzed.
The main types of data analysis were coding, highlighting the main analytical concepts and
categories, and their further development and interpretation. The interviews were analyzed through
thematic, axial and selective coding. In analyzing the data, we identified some of the most significant
codes, which were then combined into larger analytical categories. The key category of analysis was the
concept of oil-dependent community. We divided this concept into the following subcategories: norms
and rules of oil-dependent communities, myths and rituals of oil-dependent communities, cultural
fakes, conflicts and risks in oil-dependent communities, and tools for conflict resolution. For a more
complete disclosure of categories, we used memos. During our research, we revisited the selected
codes and categories and made new interpretations based on newly collected materials. In further data
collection and analysis, we compared the new data and the existing analytical categories, refined them,
and made a more complete description and interpretation of the categories. Disclosure of the key
category through the constant comparison and the addition of related categories was used to specify
the studied social processes conceptually. This allowed us to substantiate our conclusions about the
influence of oil resources on societal relations.
Furthermore, we used participative observation as a research method in the following indigenous
settlements located in oil-drilling areas: Krasnoe, Nelmin Nos, Horey Ver (NAO), Nekrasovka (Sakhalin),
and Seiha (YNAO). The observation was conducted during a period lasting from two weeks to a month
in each community. During the observation, we lived in the settlements and took part in the daily aairs
of the communities together with the residents: we attended public events in cultural centers, museums
and village councils; we went fishing and gathering; and we participated in informal meetings and
holidays. While observing, the researchers kept diaries that were later analyzed. This llowed us to
study the life of the communities from the inside and helped us to reveal practices of interaction
between indigenous communities, oil companies and state authorities. Additionally, it allowed us to
analyze the implementation of various rules concerning benefit-sharing arrangements.
We also analyzed the federal and regional laws that regulate the relationship between oil companies
and local residents, and studied local press and corporate reports about sustainable development.
The following federal and international documents were analyzed: the Land Code; the laws On
Subsoil Resources, On the guarantees of the rights of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the
Russian Federation and On the territories of traditional use of natural resources of the small-numbered
indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation; the Convention on Biological Diversity; the ILO
Convention on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, etc. Furthermore, we analyzed corporate reports and
regional media in order to identify the main trends of corporate social programs in the regions.
The data were collected between 2011 and 2017 as follows: NAO (June 2011), Sakhalin
(August 2015), YANO (July 2017), KHMAO (January 2016, February 2017) and NAO (2016) (We are very
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grateful to Maria Tysiachniuk and Galina Grening for their contribution to the materials). The duration
of the study over several years allowed us to analyze the changes that have taken place in the
local communities.
We used triangulation to ensure the validity of the interviews, observations, publications and
documents. The combination of materials helped us to analyze the practices of benefit-sharing
arrangements from the perspective of various groups of actors.
We anonymized the data to protect the privacy of our informants. Each interviewee was informed
about the nature of the research and publications, and their oral consent was received prior to
participation. The article does not provide facts about the actors, but it does describe the main practices
of interaction between indigenous communities and oil companies in Russian regions.
In this research, we focus on the influence of oil on institutions and identify the basic aspects of the
changes caused by this influence. We also analyze the transformation of social institutions under the
impact of oil revenues. Then we discuss the main stages of oil expansion, the specifics of the distribution
of authority and resources in oil rich regions, and the conflicts associated with these processes. Further,
we elaborate the main forms of agreement between oil companies, indigenous people and the authorities
in the studied Russian regions. We also discuss the norms and understandings that are rooted in
oil-dependent communities and are influential in terms of the execution of agreements. Finally,
we present conclusions about the basic features of agreements related to the distribution of benefits in
the regions.
4. The Institute of Benefit-Sharing Agreements in Russian Oil-Dependent Communities
The prosperity of oil-dependent societies is based on oil rent, but the rules of the distribution of
oil benefits rouse many dierences of opinion and discussions, particularly because the redistribution
of oil revenues in oil-dependent societies often occurs on an informal basis. Concurrently, various
instruments of governance, aimed at a just and equitable distribution of natural resource benefits
among various groups of stakeholders, are actively being promoted [20,32]. That said, the concept of
just and equitable distribution of benefits has gained wide acceptance around the world. It originated
in international conventions aimed at protecting biological resources and is associated with the idea of
social and environmental justice [32,33]. This concept has also been widely accepted in the field of
oil extraction [34,35]. The just distribution of resources is implemented in the form of benefit-sharing
agreements between oil companies and local residents. On the one hand, these agreements take
into account interaction with indigenous peoples, since oil extraction influences their environment
and traditional lifestyles. Intensive oil production leads to environmental contamination, reduced
wildlife populations, altered migratory routes, and lost fish populations in rivers. This has a negative
eect on hunting and fishing, which are traditional livelihoods of indigenous people. On the other
hand, the expansion of oil extraction means occupying land areas that are used by indigenous
people [36]. Based on all this, indigenous people are entitled to a share in the revenues of industrial
production [32,33].
Normally, benefit-sharing agreements are considered in the literature as a positive innovation that
promotes sustainable development in natural resource governance. These agreements enable local
communities to share the benefits of natural resource extraction. In many cases, the compensation is
calculated according to damage and lost profits. Other arrangements include partnership or sponsorship
agreements. Such agreements are regarded as a means for indigenous people to protect their rights,
to support and strengthen their own institutions and to preserve their traditional lifestyle [34,35].
However, there is no consensus on their eectiveness. From the point of view of corporate managers,
the agreements help to establish positive and trustworthy relations between companies and local
residents. From the point of view of local residents, companies primarily use these agreements to
achieve pragmatic goals and to reduce social and economic risks—in other words, they have nothing
to do with trust. A number of researchers are skeptical about these agreements, saying that they do not
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allow locals to participate in decision making. If resources are not redistributed justly, the agreements
do not prevent inequality [37,38].
Some of the main aspects of reaching such agreements are highlighted in the scientific
literature [32–34]. First of all, there are benefits that communities can gain from companies. These
benefits can be passed to a community in various forms: as taxes (formal benefits), as compensation
(formal benefits), as private-public partnerships initiated by authorities, companies and indigenous
people (semi-formal arrangements), as charity programs (charitable giving), and as side benefits
of industrial activity, including the creation of jobs and infrastructure development (trickle-down
benefits) [39].
The second important aspect of entering such agreements is transparency and the participation
of local residents in the distribution of benefits. This involves the introduction of transparent and
formalized rules that govern the redistribution of benefits [36,38,39].
Finally, these agreements serve to address companies’ degree of influence over local communities.
This includes the regular evaluation of environmental contamination, changes in the lifestyle, the degree
of loss of traditional culture, and the deterioration of the social fabric caused by industrial activity.
It has been posited that the level of compensation to a community from a company is proportional to
the eects of the industrial activity on the community [30,38,39]. In this study, we address agreements
between oil and gas companies and indigenous peoples in Russia.
Russian practice regarding these agreements diers from international practice. In Russia, the
agreements are concluded not only between indigenous peoples and corporations, but also between
companies and authorities. It means that the funds received from companies are used both for
indigenous people and for the rest of the population living near industrial enterprises. The idea of
such agreements is rooted in the Soviet era, when state-owned enterprises were responsible for the
social sphere of the settlements in which they operated [5,39].
Nowadays oil companies, locals and authorities use various types of agreements to resolve
conflicts. These applied agreements enable compensating the locals for damage and supporting the
local communities. They function as benefit-sharing agreements in the Russian context. The main
types of benefit-sharing agreements used in the Russian regions are as follows [5,18,19,39] (See Table 1):
- Semi-formal agreements on compensating for damage;
- Formal agreements on compensating for damage;
- Partnership agreements for socio-economic collaboration;
- Sponsorship agreements.
Table 1. Types of benefit-sharing arrangements in the Russian regions.
Form of Agreement Basis of theAgreement Transparency Decision Making Focus of the Agreement
Semi-formal agreements
between companies and
indigenous people
Personal relations Non-transparent Companies, state Material support
Formal agreements
between companies and
indigenous people
State legislation Transparent Companies, state Financial compensation
Partnership agreements
between companies, state,
and indigenous people
Corporate and
international
standards
Transparent Companies, state,communities
Development of local
initiatives and social
infrastructure
Sponsorship
Corporate
standards and
personal relations
Semi-transparent Companies Small charitable donations
Semi-formal agreements between oil companies and indigenous people on compensating for damage caused by
the oil industry. These agreements were typically concluded by and between companies and indigenous
communities without the participation of the state. According to these agreements, the companies
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would pay reindeer herders compensation for land annexed for oil production. The money was
used for vehicles, petrol, processing equipment, food, and transportation. Most of these agreements
had been made on a short-term basis. The contents of the agreements were confidential, and only
community leaders usually knew the amount of the money paid. Agreements were also often made
with municipalities. In Russia, they are legal persons and their populations often consist of both
indigenous and non-indigenous people. Sometimes oil companies also made agreements with the
leaders of indigenous farms.
The amounts of compensation were determined in informal discussions between the oil companies
and local leaders, and they mostly depended on the negotiation skills of the latter. If the locals did not
have the relevant knowledge and skills, the amounts of compensation were insignificant. “Oil companies
signed support agreements, for example to transport you to and from, and you would sign the agreement that I
will pass through your lands. Like in the case of Indians, precious wealth was plundered” (Indigenous person,
KMAO, 2017). Such agreements were very common from the 1990s up to the mid-2000s, when active
oil production started in the northern territories. Both parties noticed the instability of such agreements:
“We are building an oil pipeline, for land we have already paid, but he says: Give me three more tons of diesel. I
say: Listen, we have already paid—and he says: you give me more right now, I need it. I say: you’re insolent. He:
Well, then I will not let you build” (Representative of an oil company, Komi Republic, 2015). Currently
such informal agreements have been replaced by more formalized calculations of compensation.
Formalized agreements between oil companies and indigenous people on compensating for damage caused
by oil drilling. These are agreements on compensating for damage in favor of indigenous people in
connection with the acquisition of land and lost profits. The agreements are signed between oil
companies and indigenous households, indigenous enterprises or indigenous NGOs. They are based
on Russian Laws passed during 1990–2000 and aimed at regulating the relationship between oil and
gas companies and local people. The manner of signing them varies from region to region because of
disparities between regional laws. For example in KMAO, the law Territories of Traditional Nature Use
(TTNU) was passed. According to this law, indigenous people who have registered rights to territories
of traditional nature management, can receive substantial compensation from oil companies that engage
in industrial activities on their land. If an indigenous people do not have ocially registered rights to
such a territory, then the companies will sign the relevant agreements with the local administration
that will collect the compensation. In such cases, the local administration decides how and when
to spend this money [39]. In Yakutia, there is a law on ethnological impact assessment that also
allows indigenous people practicing a traditional lifestyle to receive compensation from companies. In
some regions, indigenous people have not ocially registered as owners or lease holders of land and
therefore cannot count on receiving compensation from companies. In such cases, only reindeer farms
with legally registered rights to agricultural land are entitled to compensation. For example in YNAO,
only state reindeer enterprises have ocially registered land areas, while ordinary reindeer herders do
not, and therefore cannot, receive compensation.
The amounts of compensation are determined in accordance with a formal method, approved
by the Ministry of Economic Development in 2009, of calculating the damage when agricultural
land is acquired for industrial use. This method is applied in YNAO and NAO. In comparison
with the previous practice of concluding semi-formal agreements, the calculation of compensation
in accordance with the formal rules proved to be more beneficial to reindeer herders: “The previous
method was less expensive for the companies : : : which means that the digits were fewer” (Representative
of an oil company, Komi Republic, 2015). The use of formal rules of calculating compensation also
enabled companies to hedge themselves against additional demands from reindeer herders, and to
reduce the risk of conflicts with locals: “Transitional period—troubled times of reformation—you could ask
for something. Since the interaction is limited within the bounds of the agreement, you cannot demand anything.
The companies consider such asking as blackmail” (Representative of local administration, NAO, 2016).
However, the new rules underwent amendments. In 2017, the method of calculating losses caused
by the annexation of agricultural land was amended, which reduced the amount of compensation.
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According to the interviews, the new way of calculating these payments became more profitable for oil
companies, while indigenous communities lost some money (Director of reindeer herding enterprises,
YNAO, 2017).
Apart from agreements on compensating for the annexation of land and lost profits, there are
other compensation agreements, albeit less significant ones. These include agreements of servitude,
which allow the use of agricultural land for industrial purposes without changing the category of the
land. An example of such an agreement is the use of agricultural land for constructing a winter road to
be used by an oil company.
Partnership agreements between companies, authorities and indigenous people. Partnership agreements
can be bilateral or trilateral. Normally, these agreements are concluded at the regional or district level.
The agreements are voluntary, since there are no legal requirements to sign them. However, in practice,
refusal to sign one will result in troubled relations between a company and the authorities, as well
as in bureaucratic hurdles: “You cannot enter a territory without charitable or sponsorship spending” or
“For any incoming company, it means a school or kindergarten” (Oil & Gas company’s representative,
Republic of Komi, 2015). Within the framework of these agreements, companies allocate funds for
the construction of social infrastructure in villages. Such agreements can be aimed at supporting the
whole population or the indigenous people in the oil drilling area. They are used to build schools,
hospitals, sports facilities, cultural centers and residential buildings and to support local entrepreneurs.
There are no formal criteria for the amount of money the company has to pay, but normally to the
sums correlate with the amount of oil produced in the region. In most cases, the regional authorities
decide how and when to spend these funds.
An exception to the above is the island of Sakhalin, where Sakhalin Energy and Exxon Neftegaz
Limited attempted to introduce international standards that govern community relations. Following
the demands of international organizations, Sakhalin Energy decided to assist the development of
indigenous communities by drawing up a plan for supporting the indigenous peoples of North
Sakhalin. This plan comprised a trilateral agreement between Sakhalin Energy, the regional authorities
and the Regional Council of Authorized Indigenous People and it was aimed at strengthening
the company’s image as a socially responsible operator and at establishing a partnership with the
indigenous communities [40,41].
The key idea behind the plan was to develop a partnership with the community. It was based
on international standards sanctioned by the IMF, the World Bank, and the ILO [36,37]. It was also
influenced by the corporate standards of Shell and BP. The company attempted to create a transparent
and collegial decision-making procedure. The plan was to be managed by the company and the
representatives of the local authorities, and the main decisions regarding the distribution of funds
were to be made by the representatives of the indigenous peoples [40,41]. Exxon Neftegaz Limited,
based on the experience of Sakhalin Energy, developed a similar model of interaction with the
indigenous communities. The company made a trilateral agreement with the regional authorities
and the indigenous peoples. However, the main decisions regarding the distribution of funds to
social projects were made by the company managers with the contribution of representatives of the
indigenous peoples and authorities.
Sponsorship. Through this type of an agreement, a company provides small-scale financial support
to local communities. The support consists of financing educational and cultural events, gifts for
veterans, transportation, training etc. Within the framework of these agreements, companies also
provide small amounts of money (on average 30–50 thousand rubles) to local libraries, schools and
cultural centers.
The abovementioned agreements make it possible to reduce conflicts between companies and local
residents. They also enable the redistribution of a small portion of profits to communities. In Russian
regions, conflict resolution and the signing of benefit-sharing agreements takes place mainly within a
framework that is typically found in a neopatrimonial society. The local peculiarities of this activity
will be discussed hereunder.
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5. Findings
5.1. Oil and Local Neopatrimonialism
Authoritarian relations in oil-dependent societies are particularly patrimonial by nature [8,10,11].
They mainly exploit political and economic authority for personal gain through an overwhelming
body of informal rules and exchanges. A strictly vertical system of relationships and the presence of a
dominating actor are a prerequisite for neopatrimonialism. The accelerated growth of neopatrimonialism
in oil-dependent communities is related to the capabilities that authorities gain through oil money
and the ensuing limitations. Authorities are given a possibility to generate hyper profits without
substantially reforming the economy and society. Meanwhile, they need not have any economic
interest in the local residents because of the confidentiality of hyper oil profits and a nontransparent
system of profit distribution [8]. Interaction between oil companies, authorities and indigenous people
typically exhibits the following features.
First, the interaction is based on a hierarchical model that entails the domination of a certain
group of actors in the decision-making process, while the rest of the stakeholders try to adapt to the
dominant actor’s disposition. At the regional level, oil companies and authorities are the dominant
actors. The rest of the actors attempt to establish good relations with them and to seek their support.
This enables them to attain financial support for arranging events in villages, purchasing necessary
equipment for schools and hospitals, paying for air travel from settlements to the regional centers,
organizing events in cultural centers and libraries, and constructing residential buildings.
Second, this interaction is personalized and its success depends on personal contacts. Formal
rules are not as much of a key factor in such interaction as are established contacts: “Their (company’s)
director has changed, so we need to go and establish contact. The first contact is the most important one. If he
gets a good feeling about us, he will give us something. Earlier, we used to take the longer path. But when you
go straight to the director, everything is decided very fast. It all depends on whether you can establish a good
relation with the director. Go there to decide on some matters: overflows and other such things” (Director of
a reindeer farm, NAO, 2017).
Third, the relationships are based on semi-formal exchange. This takes place among various
groups and helps distribute the oil rent among them. Despite the fact that oil companies get their main
permits and licenses from the federal authorities, some matters of influence, related to bureaucratic
processes, are in the hands of regional authorities.
Overall, in order to succeed, companies must obtain regional support. To gain it, they are required
to make significant social investments, which leads to an overall improvement of the economic and
social climate of the region. Semi-formal exchange between oil companies and authorities enables
social patronage practices that benefit the majority of the population. It also helps to maintain economic
prosperity and political stability in the regions: “Let’s do this and that. The governor has signed a new
agreement on the first of May. Under this agreement a lot of money was allocated for road repairs in the city,
since soon we will have elections, hence people might show annoyance” (Representative of an oil company,
KMAO, 2014).
The fourth feature is the variability of formal rules concerning the redistribution of funds.
In a number of cases, the presence of formal rules is not the only basis for making decisions. Until the end
of the 2000s, the amount and form of compensation to indigenous people was determined during the
course of informal negotiations between the local leaders and company managers. The outcomes of such
negotiations could be unknown to both the authorities and the members of the community. However,
the existence of formal rules does not necessarily change the situation. If the rules contradict the interests
of the dominating stakeholders, they are either revised or adjusted when applied. For example, issuing
a method of calculating the amount of compensation when annexing agricultural land for industrial
purposes did formalize the interaction between companies and reindeer herders. However, a few
years later—in 2017—the method was revised, which led to a reduction in the amount of compensation.
In many cases, despite the legally armed rights of indigenous people to their traditional territory,
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they usually cannot stop oil companies from using the land for oil production: “They are obligated to get
our consent under 145 regional laws. We cannot say yes or no. As per their understanding, we must always say
yes. If we say no, they start pressuring us” (Indigenous person, KMAO, 2014). For example, in a conflict
between locals and oil companies in KMAO caused by oil production in the area of Lake Numto, the
company initially tried to use formal tools of conflict resolution. They conducted open hearings and
considered various options of compensating the indigenous people. However, when the locals refused
to accept any form of oil production in the area, the company lobbied its interests through the regional
authorities, who shared the values of economic prosperity with them [34,38].
Overall, the neopatrimonial system of relations aects the distribution of funds among companies,
authorities and indigenous people and influences the social and cultural practices of local communities.
In the following, we will take a detailed look at this influence by discussing the cultural consequences
of agreements between oil companies and indigenous people.
5.2. Traditional Culture and Petroleum Patronage
Social patronage, inherent in oil-dependent communities, is best depicted in the field of culture.
Oil and gas companies often participate in the financing and support of various projects related to
preservation of the traditional culture of indigenous people. This corporate support can be considered
as a form of benefit sharing. It helps companies to convince their western partners of how well
they comply with international standards regarding indigenous people. Apart from that, even minor
spending on cultural events enables them to gain the approval of indigenous residents. This support
includes a number of typical features. The most common cultural programs are related to the financing
of traditional festivities [42–44], where indigenous people hold national sports competitions, arrange
folklore performances, have national dress competitions, and perform ancient pagan rituals. During
these festivities, also meetings between the authorities, companies and locals are arranged. The most
popular of these events is the Reindeer Herder’s Day. Companies assist in the arrangement of this
occasion by covering transportation costs and by purchasing necessary goods, gifts and prizes.
Another important target of financial assistance from oil companies is the preservation of traditional
crafts. This assistance is oered to master’s and regular courses at schools or cultural centers in wood
carving, weaving, embroidery etc. On these courses, students make for instance national dresses,
traditional toys and crockery, and items used in performing pagan rituals. According to educational
programs, the main objective of such courses is the acquisition of traditional knowledge. Meanwhile,
a number of experts note that the function of the courses is to convert knowledge into folklore, rather
than propagating its practical applications [45]. The students are familiarized with typical elements of
national culture that were created in the past and adhere to a single uniform standard. Often, however,
people have already lost the skills needed to prepare such items. In such cases, some items must be
ordered from masters in other regions so that they can be placed on display in cultural centers and
regional museums.
Companies also give financial assistance to national language preservation projects. The money
received is spent for example on printing books containing fairytales and songs in national languages.
Interestingly, representatives of oil companies are convinced that such projects help preserve
indigenous peoples’ traditions that existed before the Soviet era. In fact, most of these projects are aimed
at the reproduction of cultural practices created by the Soviet authorities. For example, indigenous
people’s fairytales and songs could not even be published without the alphabet that Soviet authorities
created for them. Another example of Soviet influence is the widely known Reindeer Herder’s Day,
which is often presented as an indisputable proof of the preservation of ancestral tradition. However,
it is actually a Soviet invention, and was celebrated for the first time in 1932. An article entitled Down
with the Old Holidays! in a 1932 issue of the Soviet newspaper Nyaryana vynder reads: “Earlier, the Nenets
celebrated old holidays : : : But a new life has begun. Today, Party and Komsomol cells were formed here for the
first time; they held a meeting and decided not to celebrate old church holidays in the tundra. Instead of Elijah’s
Day they will now create their own holiday on 1 August, which they have named “Reindeer Day.” This is a
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new rational holiday. We should support it and make it a holiday for all the Nenets people of the okrug” [46].
The Soviet holiday was dedicated to the profession of reindeer herding. This suggested that reindeer
herding was perceived as professional activity, not as a lifestyle practiced by the nomadic Nenets
for centuries. As seen from the newspaper article, the goal of this holiday was to abolish old, partly
Christianized pagan traditions and to promote new values.
The preparation of traditional items has been adjusted to make them more conspicuous and to
bring the indigenous lifestyle to the attention of oil companies and authorities, in particular. Therefore,
traditional festival costumes are sewn in vivid colors to attract the attention of the audience. As some
regions have already lost the knowledge and skills needed for preparing traditional items, they are
ordered from other regions and from people who may have nothing to do with the culture in question:
“On Reindeer Herder’s Day we now wear stylized clothes. For example, the deerskin parka has decreased in size.
Now we call them miniskirts. Why? Because it has to look spectacular on stage” (Local resident, KMAO,
2014). Most of the cultural plans are aimed at preserving traditionalism by creating folklore ensembles,
reviving old crafts, publishing old tales and legends, arranging national festivities etc.
A few main issues determining the nature of cultural projects supported by oil companies in the
Russian regions can be identified. The first and most important one is related to the goals sought
by the companies when they participate in the cultural programs of local communities. Rather than
developing and preserving local culture, such corporate programs are focused on minimizing the
risks bearing down on the company’s activity in the region [35]. From the company point of view,
cultural events serve to legitimize oil companies in the eyes of local communities and thereby to
reduce the likelihood of conflicts [4,12]. Focusing on national culture helps oil companies to create a
historical justification for their operation, to relate modern industrial activity with the locality’s history.
For locals, these events are an opportunity to draw the attention of the stronger actors—authorities
and businesses—to local problems. All the while, companies emphasize their financial support in
carrying out such events and thereby show their social responsibility. This instrumental approach
to culture is typical for both authorities and corporations. Therefore, many projects in the sphere of
culture have little to do with culture, and are instead cultural charades that make local communities
shift their attention from more acute issues to cultural ones.
The second important issue involves assuming a paternalistic attitude towards indigenous
people [34,39]. This concerns state policies as well as corporate projects. In an attempt to support
local culture in Russian regions, oil companies reproduce the same practices as Russian authorities
typically do. In most cases, corporations prefer to interact not with local people, but with state
authorities, providing them with funds to develop the regions at their own discretion. The authorities,
for their part, then distribute the gained funds using traditional command-and-control methods.
The paternalistic attitude towards grantees is reinforced by a lack of company interest in local residents.
Local people, who lack the necessary qualifications and skills, are of no interest to companies as
potential employees. Therefore, companies establish charitable relations with indigenous people.
As a result, charity programs do not help in balancing the social scene or in fostering culture. Even
when oil and gas companies attempt to apply a project approach towards the implementation of social
and cultural undertakings in the regions, it does not change the situation much. Despite the fact that
the project approach enables the development of local initiatives, the selection of projects is based on
a traditionalistic approach to culture.
Third, a definite limitation in developing and selecting cultural programs is oil companies’
stereotypical thinking regarding indigenous culture. One of the main stereotypical ideas concerning
indigenous culture is that it is an unchanging lifestyle. Despite the fact that many indigenous peoples
still engage in traditional activities related to nomadic reindeer herding, fishing and hunting, they
regularly use modern equipment, such as satellite phones, diesel-powered generators, snowmobiles
etc. This astonishes nonlocal stakeholders. “They already can’t imagine themselves without snowmobiles.
And this is no traditional lifestyle. The traditional lifestyle is the reindeer sleigh. And no diesel stations.
[Laughs.] Because the traditional lifestyle is the way your ancestors lived. Of course, they didn’t have anything
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like that”(Manager of an oil company, KMAO, 2014). External actors arrange their expectations and
demands regarding a given culture on the basis of stereotypes [42]. The only projects that attain
support correspond to the dominating stakeholders’ ideas about traditional culture. Hence, when
planning cultural programs, indigenous people consider not only the needs of their own community,
but also the expectations of external actors sponsoring the events.
According to R. Douglas, a community’s dependence on oil production influences its culture.
In other words, the more a community depends on oil-related revenue, the more its culture depends on
the provider of oil rent. This prompts it to apply a vertically integrated structure, through which it loses
space for creativity [4]. Broadly speaking, the vertical integration of culture into the economy leads to
the formation of an aggregate of cultural values that propagates all over the country. This propagation
is due to broader social processes and the adoption of a broader set of norms and values inherent in an
oil-dependent society. It also gives birth to new myths and rituals in society.
5.3. Myths and Rituals of the Oil-Dependent Society
The eectiveness and use of formal rules governing the distribution of benefits between oil
companies, authorities and indigenous people are mostly determined by the values and norms
prevailing in a given society. The specifics of political and economic systems designed to support
oil production influence the spread of certain myths and rituals in society. The terms “myths” and
“rituals”, however, do not necessarily translate into either fabulousness or ineectiveness. First of all,
these terms indicate one of the basic functions of the conducted events—the legitimization of values
in a given society. Second, they highlight faith in certain events and procedures. Institutional theory
deals with institutional mimicry, which means that the more successful institutional experiments are,
the more actors elsewhere copy or reproduce them. In so doing, the initial idea behind the eective
rules is lost and institutional reproduction remains only a ritual. In the following, we discuss some
examples of institutional mimicry.
The fundamental beliefs of an oil-dependent society sprout from faith in technology, from the
predictability of risks and from the presence of a uniform pyramid of values. An analysis of corporate
reports and state documentation, available at the Ministry of Economic Development and Department
of Natural Resources websites, indicates a focus on the development of safe and ecient technologies
for the production and processing of oil. In most of the interviews with authorities and representatives
of oil and gas companies, the phrase “All risks are calculated” is stated. But in practice, many of
the calculations behind the phrase have been made without considering all possible consequences.
Such calculations did not help retain fish populations in northern rivers or prevent oil spills and other
industrial accidents. The belief in minimizing risks is closely connected to the conviction that all
aspects of human activity can be converted into quantitative indicators and monetized—from the
eects of oil drilling on soil and water all the way to the value of human life. Some believe that damage
can always be first calculated with a certain method and then paid for. However, the paid amounts are
not always comparable to the realized loss and cost. Apart from that, the extent of compensation is
determined in federal and regional laws, on which the stronger stakeholders often have more influence
than the weaker ones.
The beliefs prevailing in oil-dependent societies also lean on widespread cross-hierarchical values,
according to which material prosperity outweighs the ecological aspects of oil production and the values
of local culture. The basic assumption is that prosperity has the same meaning for all stakeholders.
For example, it is taken for granted that all local residents will appreciate new roads. However, among
reindeer herders and other traditional communities, people may find the construction of roads alarming
because it will allow nonlocal stakeholders easy access to their land, hunting grounds, reindeer farms
and holy places. Another example demonstrating the dierence between the hierarchical values of
oil companies and indigenous people concerns the annexation of land. Local residents practicing
a traditional lifestyle often consider authority over their ancestral territories more important than
financial compensation from oil companies: “Many can be bought out, but many don’t, because what will
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we leave for our future generations? Do we want them to say: “Our grandfathers sold everything” (Indigenous
resident, KMAO, 2014).
Another belief among oil-dependent communities manifests itself as faith in the infinite financial
capacity of the oil industry. The majority of people in Russia think that oil companies, if willing, can
resolve all material problems in the territories where they do business: “Those who have oil companies in
their area are the lucky ones” (Chief of a reindeer farm, NAO, 2016). However, people seldom realize that
the budgets of oil companies have their limitations and cannot cover all the needs of the people.
This belief is supported by the rituals, of which there are two main groups in oil-dependent
societies: rituals of public participation and rituals of demonstrating the credibility of calculating and
evaluating risks.
The first group of rituals consists of activities such as public hearings and consultations with
people, provision of feedback to industrial concerns and authorities, public declaration of standards of
social responsibility, creation of coordination councils, and publication of corporate policies and reports.
The second group of rituals consists of conducting examinations and audits. Russian legislation
stipulates for a mandatory environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure. Apart from that,
companies that function under international standards and are backed by international financial banks
must conduct additional risk evaluations to meet the requirements of their international investors.
It is to be noted that instead of being a waste of time, arrangements such as public assemblies, expert
evaluations and coordination councils actually enable local residents to take part in decision making
and in assessing certain risks. These arrangements often promote the local residents’ interests and help
to avert possible conflicts. However, their eectiveness should not be overestimated. In a number
of cases, public hearings are little more than an imitation of public participation and the evaluations
are erroneous. Public meetings sometimes concentrate on formalities instead of discussing project
details with the locals. In such cases, the hearings may be held in such a way that the locals either do
not know about them or are unable to participate because they live far away and cannot travel to the
venue: “We don’t demand millions. We just want to be left with some land. I ask them not to drill here, but
they insist. They have occupied the territory and we are as if in a cage. They don’t back o. You cannot say
NO” (Indigenous resident, KMAO, 2017). On the one hand, the meetings help to take the local views
into consideration and to avert the negative impacts of industrial activity. On the other hand, extreme
confidence in calculating all conceivable risks and the ritualization of the public procedures reduces
local residents’ vigilance when faced with the industrial use of natural resources.
6. Conclusions
The dependence of society on a natural resource aects the development of economic, political
and social institutions. The dependence also correlates closely with the rules and practices prevailing
in this society [8,9]. Hence, oil as a key resource aects various changes taking place in society.
The availability of oil and the associated super-profits make it possible to maintain a neopatrimonial
system of relations in society and to reduce the dependence of the authorities on society. At the local
level, this is manifested in a hierarchical system of relations based on access to oil resources, the opacity
of the decision-making process and the variability of formal rules governed by the dominant players.
Supported by oil-based wellbeing, the social system stimulates the ritualization of procedures related
to public participation in decision making and strengthens informal exchange. Oil and gas companies
act as agents of oil-dependent communities and transmit the relevant values and beliefs to the people.
This leads to a transformation of norms in local communities that start to adopt new behavioral patterns
and to form ideas based on a belief in the predictability of risks and the unlimited financial capacity
of oil companies. Currently, traditional livelihoods such as reindeer herding, fishing and hunting no
longer provide sustenance for locals. Meanwhile, subsidies from the oil industry and the state help
to keep villages alive. Intensive oil production and the spreading market economy lead to a future
departure of indigenous people from the notion of measure of necessity, which has been a key value of
traditional societies. Owing to this change in values, nature is becoming primarily a source of material
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prosperity. This stimulates the formation of a universal pyramid of values dominated by economic
priorities. People’s faith in the financial capacity and assistance of oil companies makes it dicult for
local communities to develop their own projects.
It is important to note that natural resources per se do not have any positive or negative
connotations. The outcome of their use is determined not so much by the nature of the resource as
by the institutional structure of a given society [8]. Insucient development of institutions of civil
participation and an abundance of informal interaction leads to asymmetric access to valuable resources
and unequal distribution of the resulting benefits. When indigenous people are not heard, it will inflict
considerable damage upon their values and culture. This may cause discomfort among the population
and lead to conflicts. One of the key questions regarding conflicts pertains to the amounts as well as the
terms and conditions of the distribution of oil revenues. Conflicts have often been resolved merely by
allowing oil companies to determine the amount of compensation instead of amending the applicable
rules and incorporating the local residents in the decision-making process. Exceptions to the common
practice are mostly the result of pressure exerted by external actors rather than the eectiveness of
local communities. For example in Sakhalin, indigenous people gained the right to participate in the
distribution of grants from the oil and gas companies Sakhalin Energy and Exxon and to engage in the
environmental monitoring of their activities. However, the rules were changed in this case because of
pressure exerted by foreign investors Therefore, it would not be justified to conclude that conflicts
related to oil rent contribute to the construction of a civil society.
Nevertheless, these conflicts forced the state authorities to draft relevant laws that protect the
rights of indigenous people. On the other hand, they also forced corporations to pay more attention to
interaction with the communities. This resulted in the institutionalization of an arrangement referred to
as the Benefits Sharing Agreement. The neopatrimonial framework of power relations in Russian society
determines the general trends of institutionalization regarding such agreements. In Russian practice,
these agreements take dierent forms, ranging from semi-formal agreements between companies and
local communities to formal compensation and partnership programs. The agreements have both
positive and negative eects. The ways in which the agreements are implemented aects the further
development of local communities (see Figure 2).
On the one hand, the agreements enable local communities to receive material compensation
from companies. This compensation is used by residents to purchase equipment and technology.
It also allows them to increase the profitability of their farms and to engage in traditional economic
activity in the market space. The development of social infrastructure in local settlements, carried
out within the framework of partnership agreements between the authorities, companies and local
communities, leads to improved quality of life. Residential houses, schools, hospitals, sports complexes
and houses of culture are being built in villages. On the other hand, great expectations concerning
financial assistance and compensation to be received from oil companies increases the dependence of
local communities on oil money and forces the residents to follow the preferences of the dominant
players in the development of social and cultural programs. Oil patronage in the field of culture leads
to the development of souvenir cultural practices conforming to the needs and expectations of the
dominant players.
In the Russian context, benefit-sharing agreements have specific features. First, they are controlled
by the state. In the Russian regions, state authorities play an important role in the signing of agreements.
For example, it is the authorities who negotiate with companies about the amount and forms of support
they are to give to communities on the regional and local levels. Even when an agreement is concluded
between a company and a nongovernmental organization that protects the rights of indigenous people,
the negotiations are greatly influenced by the state. As a result, the values of the oil Leviathan dominate
the negotiations. Economic prosperity and social benefits overrule environmental concerns and the
values of indigenous cultures.
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Figure 2. Benefit-sharing arrangements in oil dependent communities.
Second, despite the fact that in the last decade the relations between oil companies and indigenous
people have been formalized, informal rules that tend to promote the interests of the stronger
stakeholders still play a major role. In such situations, the formal rules that should reduce the negative
eects of oil production on society and the environment can turn into rituals and lose their significance.
Despite the existence of formal rules, indigenous people are often stripped o any possibility to
participate in the decision-making processes regarding their residential area. The majority of decision
makers and other stakeholder groups share the values of the oil Leviathan and think that the prosperity
of their region stems from the oil industry and that any damage to the environment or loss of traditional
culture can be repaired with money.
Third, when formal rules are implemented in accordance with their essence, it can lead to
unforeseen consequences. In other words, such procedures as risk evaluation and audits must be
focused on the impacts of oil production on local communities and the environment. Otherwise they
can produce a “Soporific eect”, and a situation may arise where a stern belief in the eectiveness of
these procedures eventually decreases public concern over adverse industrial impacts.
Further research may provide a more detailed analysis of the social and cultural consequences of
economic compensation in oil-dependent communities. That said, the role of compensation agreements
in conflict resolution is an interesting topic of investigation. On the one hand, compensation can
neutralize contradictions between companies and communities. On the other, competition for corporate
support can increase conflicts within communities. In addition, material compensation does not always
help to resolve contradictions between groups of actors with contradicting values.
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